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PREVIEW; United States v. Sanchez: A Prolonged Traffic Stop 
and the Scope of a Consensual Search 
 
Danielle Dacus* 
 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was scheduled to hear 
oral arguments in this matter on Wednesday, September 2, 2020, but 
upon issuance of an order on August 21, 2020, the Court decided to 
rule on the record and briefs alone. Caitlin Boland Aarab submitted 
the briefs on behalf of the Appellant. Thomas Keoki Godfrey 
submitted the brief on behalf of the Appellee. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The issues presented in this case are whether the Montana 
Highway Patrol Trooper unconstitutionally prolonged Manuel Paz 
Sanchez Jr.’s traffic stop and whether the Trooper had consent to 
search the spare tire located in the vehicle.1 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Manuel Paz Sanchez Jr. was stopped for a traffic violation 
by a Montana Highway Patrol Trooper.2 While the Trooper drafted 
the traffic warning, he checked Sanchez’s license and rental vehicle 
documents, and Sanchez waited in the Trooper’s patrol car.3 During 
this time, the Trooper asked Sanchez questions regarding his travel 
plans. 4  After issuing Sanchez a traffic warning, the Trooper 
requested Sanchez’s consent to search the rental car for contraband.5 
Sanchez provided both oral and written consent.6 While searching 
the vehicle, the Trooper asked for specific consent to search the 
spare tire located inside the vehicle to which Sanchez replied, “It’s 
not my tire.”7 The Trooper proceeded to search the exterior of the 
tire and eventually deployed a drug-detection dog that alerted to the 
tire.8 The Trooper then asked and received Sanchez’s consent to 
 
*J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of 
Montana Class of 2022.  
1 Opening Brief of Appellant at *10, 18, United States v. Sanchez, (9th Cir. Jan. 
28, 2020) (No. 19-30248). 
2 Answering Brief of the United States at *1, United States v. Sanchez, (9th Cir. 
Apr. 13, 2020) (No. 19-30248). 
3 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *3, 5. 
4 Id. at *4. 
5 Id. at *5. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at *6. 
8 Answering Brief of the United States at *7−8, United States v. Sanchez, (9th 
Cir. Apr. 13, 2020) (No. 19-30248). 
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search the tire’s interior.9 The Trooper located Methamphetamine 
inside the tire, and Sanchez was subsequently indicted.10 
 
Sanchez brought a motion to suppress in the district court.11 
The court held (1) the Trooper had reasonable suspicion to conduct 
the traffic stop; (2) the Trooper did not unconstitutionally prolong 
the stop because, immediately after the stop’s end, Sanchez 
provided consent for the search; and (3) the search of the spare tire 
fell within the scope of that consent. 12  Sanchez subsequently 
pleaded guilty, preserving his right to appeal the motion to 
suppress.13 Sanchez now appeals the denial of his motion.14 
 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
A. Appellant Manuel Paz Sanchez 
 
Appellant bases his appeal on two issues: (1) the stop was 
unconstitutionally prolonged because the Trooper lacked reasonable 
suspicion to continue the stop after completing its mission; and (2) 
the spare tire’s removal and search exceeded the scope of his 
consent.15 On appeal, Appellant does not contest that the Trooper 
possessed reasonable suspicion to conduct the initial traffic stop.16 
 
Appellant argues that the traffic stop was unconstitutionally 
prolonged by the Trooper’s request to search the vehicle after 
concluding the traffic stop’s mission.17 Applying the Rodriguez v. 
United States 18  standard, Appellant asserts the Trooper required 
“reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an 
individual” to continue investigating after completing tasks related 
to the mission of the traffic stop.19 Appellant asserts the Trooper did 
not possess the reasonable suspicion required and instead used drug 
trafficker stereotypes to justify his continued investigation.20 
 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at *8−9. 
12 United States v. Sanchez, No. CR 18-03-BLG-SPW, 2019 WL 1598621, slip 
op. at *2−4 (D. Mont. Apr. 15, 2019). 
13 Opening Brief of Appellant at *8−9, United States v. Sanchez, (9th Cir. Jan. 
28, 2020) (No. 19-30248). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at *10, 14. 
16 Reply Brief of Appellant at *3, United States v. Sanchez, (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 
2020) (No. 19-30248). 
17 Id. at *3−5 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 353 (2015)). 
18 575 U.S. 348 (2015). 
19 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *13 (quoting Rodriguez, 575 
U.S. at 355). 
20 Id. at *14−15 (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355). 
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Next, Appellant asserts that the Trooper’s removal and 
search of the spare tire exceeded the scope of his consent. 21 
Following Florida v. Jimeno,22 Appellant argues the scope of his 
consent to search is determined by what is objectively reasonable.23 
Appellant asserts that the Trooper’s removal and search of the rental 
car’s spare tire exceeded this standard.24 Further, Appellant asserts 
he did not expand the scope of the search and in fact limited the 
scope when he responded to the Trooper’s request to search the tire 
by stating, “It’s not my tire.” 25  Appellant finally argues his 
statement consenting to the removal of the tire from its rim was only 
provided after the Trooper’s initial unconstitutional search of the tire 
and deployment of the drug-detection dog.26 
 
B. Appellee United States of America 
 
Appellee argues (1) Sanchez’s constitutional rights were not 
violated because the stop was not unconstitutionally prolonged; (2) 
alternatively, the Trooper had reasonable suspicion to prolong the 
traffic stop; (3) the search of the tire fell within the scope of 
Sanchez’s consent; and (4) the drug-detection dog’s alert gave the 
Trooper probable cause for the search of the tire.27 
 
Appellee asserts the stop was not unconstitutionally 
prolonged because the questions asked during the stop were relevant 
to the mission of the stop and only 14 minutes elapsed from the time 
of the initial stop to the time the Trooper requested consent to 
search.28 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held a 14 minute 
traffic stop to be an acceptable length of time.29 Further, Appellee 
argues even if reasonable suspicion was necessary for the stop’s 
extension, reasonable suspicion “is not a particularly high threshold 
to reach.”30 Appellee asserts the impossibility of Sanchez’s answers 
to the Trooper’s questions combined with the Trooper’s knowledge 
 
21 Id. at *17. 
22 500 U.S. 248 (1991). 
23 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *17−18 (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. 
at 250−51). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at *18−20. 
26 Reply Brief of Appellant at *12, United States v. Sanchez, (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 
2020) (No. 19-30248). 
27 Answering Brief of the United States at *9−11, United States v. Sanchez, (9th 
Cir. Apr. 13, 2020) (No. 19-30248). 
28 Id. at *13−14. 
29 Id. (citing United States v. Turvin, 517 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
30 Id. at *14, 16−17 (quoting United States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (en banc)). 
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of drug trafficker behavior provided reasonable suspicion to prolong 
the stop.31 
 
Next, Appellee argues the Trooper did not exceed the scope 
of Sanchez’s consent because he provided voluntary oral consent 
and signed the Montana Highway Patrol search form.32 Analogizing 
this case to United States v. Gutierrez-Mederos,33 where the court 
held the search of a locked panel and removal of a cardboard divider 
fell within the scope of consent, Appellee asserts contraband is 
typically not located in plain sight, and, therefore, it is reasonable 
for a Trooper to look inside compartments when searching.34 Finally, 
Appellee asserts the Trooper received specific consent to search the 
tire’s interior and had additional probable cause to do so after the 
drug-detection dog alerted to the tire.35 
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
A. Extension of the Traffic Stop 
 
The Court must first address whether the Trooper 
unconstitutionally extended Sanchez’s traffic stop beyond its 
mission. Without independent reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity, a traffic stop cannot be prolonged after the “mission” of the 
traffic stop has been completed. 36  Additional inquiries may be 
conducted during the course of the traffic stop, but cannot prolong 
the stop “beyond the time reasonably required to complete the 
mission.”37 Generally, the mission of a traffic stop is to ensure all 
vehicles are being “safely and responsibly” operated on the 
roadway.38 This often includes reviewing the validity of the driver’s 
license and vehicle registration.39 After the officer finishes the tasks 
related to ensuring the vehicle is being safely and responsibly 
operated, the mission of the traffic stop is complete.40 
 
 
31 Id. at *17−20. 
32 Id. at *10, 23. 
33 965 F.2d 800 (1992). 
34 Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 2, at *21−23 (citing United 
States v. Gutierrez-Mederos, 965 F.2d 800, 802−03) (9th Cir. 1992)). 
35 Id. at *23−24 (citing Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013). 
36 Opening Brief of Appellant at *12−13, United States v. Sanchez, (9th Cir. Jan. 
28, 2020) (No. 19-30248) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. 348, 
356−57 (2015)). 
37 Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354−55 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 
407 (2005)). 
38 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *12−13. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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To prolong a traffic stop after the completion of its mission, 
there must be independent reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity. 41  “Particularized suspicion” from “objective and 
reasonable inferences” of “specific, articulable facts” provides a 
Trooper with reasonable suspicion.42 Objective and innocent facts 
that are meaningless to the layperson can be the basis for suspicion 
and further investigation.43 The Court must look at the totality of the 
circumstances when determining if reasonable suspicion exists.44 
 
While the Ninth Circuit will likely reach the same holding as 
the district court did when it held the Trooper’s extension of the stop 
to be constitutional, it will probably diverge from the district court’s 
reasoning. The district court incorrectly focused on the 
reasonableness of the time it took from the beginning of the stop 
until the Trooper’s request to search instead of the time between the 
completion of the stop’s mission and the Trooper’s request to 
search.45 The district court relies on United States v. Turvin,46 where 
the court determined 14 minutes to be a reasonable length for a 
traffic stop, to hold Sanchez’s 14 minute stop similarly 
constitutional. 47  However, the Ninth Circuit has stated that 
Rodriguez abrogated Turvin’s reasonableness standard for the 
extension of a traffic stop absent reasonable suspicion.48 Therefore, 
the constitutionality of the stop is based on whether or not 
reasonable suspicion existed to extend the stop after the completion 
of its mission.49 
 
After reviewing this case, the Ninth Circuit will likely hold 
the Trooper possessed reasonable suspicion to prolong Sanchez’s 
traffic stop. Before the Trooper issued the traffic warning, he 
reviewed Sanchez’s driver’s license, rental car agreement, and 
 
41 Id. (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356−57); Answering Brief of the United 
States at *12, United States v. Sanchez, (9th Cir. Apr. 13, 2020) (No. 19-30248) 
(citing United States v. Evans, 786 F.3d 779, 786 (9th Cir. 2015)). 
42 Evans, 786 F.3d at 788 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Montero-
Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). 
43 Answering Brief of the United States at *16−18, United States v. Sanchez, 
(9th Cir. Apr. 13, 2020) (No. 19-30248) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 
U.S. 266, 273−74 (2002); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). 
44 Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 2, at *16 (citing Arvizu, 534 
U.S. at 273). 
45 United States v. Sanchez, No. CR 18-03-BLG-SPW, 2019 WL 1598621, slip 
op. at *3−4 (D. Mont. Apr. 15, 2019). 
46 517 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2008). 
47 Sanchez, 2019 WL 1598621 at *3−4. 
48 United States v. Landeros, 913 F.3d 862, 866−67 (9th Cir. 2019). 
49 Opening Brief of Appellant at *12−13, United States v. Sanchez, (9th Cir. Jan. 
28, 2020) (No. 19-30248) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. 348, 
356 (2015)). 
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conducted a criminal history and El Paso Intelligence Center 
check.50 The Trooper, upon issuing the traffic warning, completed 
the mission of the traffic stop and therefore, required reasonable 
suspicion to continue the stop.51 Nevertheless, the Trooper likely 
possessed the required reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop. 
Sanchez’s impractical travel plan to drive further east than his end 
destination and then fly to the end destination, as well as the 
Trooper’s belief that the story was being made up on the spot, 
created perceived inconsistencies in his story supporting reasonable 
suspicion. 52  Further, the innocent objective facts that Sanchez 
started his trip in Sacramento, a known drug-hub, and was driving a 
rental car, a known transportation method for drug distributors, can 
support reasonable suspicion when considered under the totality of 
the circumstances. 53  Therefore, the Court will likely hold the 
Trooper did not unconstitutionally prolong the stop because  
reasonable suspicion existed to extend the stop.  
 
B. Scope of Consent 
 
The Court must decide two key issues regarding the search 
of the tire: (1) whether the original consent included the exterior of 
the tire; and, (2) if it did include the exterior of the tire, whether that 
consent was limited by Sanchez’s later statement.  
 
When an individual consents to a search, reasonableness 
determines the permissible scope of search.54 A Trooper may search 
locations that are objectively reasonable when searching for the 
stated item.55 Contraband is not generally strewn throughout the 
car.56 Therefore, when consent to search for contraband is provided, 
containers such as paper bags 57  or locked compartments 58  are 
 
50 Id. at *3−5. 
51 Id. at *14 (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355) 
52 Answering Brief of the United States at *17−18, United States v. Sanchez, 
(9th Cir. Apr. 13, 2020) (No. 19-30248). 
53 Id. at *16, 19−20. 
54 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *17−18 (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 
500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)). 
55 Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 249 (1991). 
56 Reply Brief of Appellant at *21−22, United States v. Sanchez, (9th Cir. Apr. 
20, 2020) (No. 19-30248). 
57 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *18 (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 
251 (holding the search of a paper bag located in the vehicle based on a consent 
to search for narcotics to be reasonable)). 
58 Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 2, at *22−23 (citing United 
States v. Gutierrez-Mederos, 965 F.2d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding the 
officer’s search of a locked compartment and removal of cardboard divider 
when searching a vehicle based on consent to search for contraband to be 
reasonable)). 
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considered reasonable locations to search.59 Troopers do not need to 
ask for subsequent consent to search items that are considered 
objectively reasonable for the search they are conducting, because 
they fall within the original scope of consent.60  
 
After an individual has provided consent for a search, they 
may subsequently limit the scope of their consent.61 Although the 
Ninth Circuit has no precedent on what constitutes a valid 
withdrawal of consent, it has previously referenced the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals’ definition when discussing the issue.62 
The Eighth Circuit has held that, similar to providing consent, a 
withdrawal of consent is determined by what an objectively 
reasonable person would understand from the statement or actions.63 
Further, withdrawing consent cannot be ambiguous and must be 
done using an unequivocal statement or action.64   
 
Here, it is highly likely the Court will consider the exterior 
of the spare tire to be an objectively reasonable location to search 
for contraband. Sanchez consented to the Trooper’s search for 
contraband. 65  Therefore, the scope of consent encompassed 
locations within the vehicle that would be objectively reasonable to 
search when looking for contraband.66 Based on court precedent 
allowing the search of the interior of various containers during a 
consensual search for contraband, the exterior of any item within a 
vehicle, including a tire, likely falls within the scope of consent.67 
 
Additionally, the Court will likely hold Sanchez’s 
subsequent response to the Trooper’s request for specific consent to 
 
59 Id. at *21−22 (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251)). 
60 United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 477 (9th Cir. 1994); Opening Brief of 
Appellant, supra note 1, at *18 (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252). 
61 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *20 (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 
251−52). 
62 United States v. Russell, 664 F.3d 1279, 1282, 1284 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 
United States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768, 776 (8th Cir. 2005)). 
63 Sanders, 424 F.3d at 774 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding the action of repeatedly 
covering pockets during a consensual search to withdraw consent to search 
pockets because reasonable person would understand this as a withdrawal). 
64 Id. at 774−75; United States v. Gray, 369 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(citing United States v. Ross, 263 F.3d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding 
statement about a search taking too long is not an unequivocal withdrawal of 
consent)). 
65 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *5. 
66 Answering Brief of the United States at *22−23, United States v. Sanchez, 
(9th Cir. Apr. 13, 2020) (No. 19-30248) (citing United States v. Gutierrez-
Mederos, 965 F.2d 800, 803−04 (9th Cir. 1992)); Opening Brief of Appellant, 
supra note 1, at *5, 17−18 (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251). 
67 Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 2, at *22 (citing United 
States v. Cannon, 29 F.2d 472, 477 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
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search the tire did not limit the original consent. 68  Sanchez 
consented to the search of the vehicle and, therefore, could limit or 
withdraw his consent.69 However, following the Eighth Circuit’s 
standard, Sanchez’s statement, “It’s not my tire,” is unlikely to be 
understood by an objectively reasonable person as withdrawing 
consent because it is a statement regarding the tire’s ownership and 
does not directly address the scope of the search.70 Further, as it does 
not expressly limit the scope of the consensual search, it is unlikely 
to be seen as an unequivocal statement withdrawing consent to 
search the spare tire.71 Therefore, the Court will likely hold that the 
Trooper’s inspection of the exterior of the tire was constitutional.  
 
Since the inspection of the exterior of the tire was likely 
within the scope of consent, the Trooper’s use of a drug-detection 
dog on the exterior of the tire is also likely constitutional. Sanchez’s 
unwithdrawn consent to search for contraband likely justified the 
Trooper’s use of a drug-detection dog on the exterior of the spare 
tire. 72  The positive alert from the Trooper’s drug-detection dog 
provided probable cause to search the interior of the tire.73 Moreover, 
Sanchez supplied specific consent to search the interior of the tire 
by stating “[y]eah,” when asked by the Trooper if he could take the 
tire to a nearby shop to remove it from the rim.74 Therefore, the 
Court will likely hold the search of the tire’s interior to be 
constitutional. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This case presents opportunities for the Ninth Circuit, first, 
to solidify the Rodriguez rule that prolonging a traffic stop beyond 
the stop’s mission requires reasonable suspicion, and, second, to set 
precedent on what constitutes a withdrawal of consent. The Court 
will likely hold that the Trooper had reasonable suspicion to prolong 
the stop, making the stop’s extension constitutional. Additionally, 
due to the broad scope of Sanchez’s consent to search for contraband, 
the Court will likely hold the search of the exterior of the tire fell 
 
68 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *18−19. 
69 Id.; Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 2, at *22. 
70 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *6. 
71 United States v. Gray, 369 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing United 
States v. Ross, 263 F.3d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 2001)). 
72 Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 2, at *7−8. 
73 Id. at *24 (citing United States v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237(2015)) (note: correct 
citation for cited case is Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013)); Florida v. 
Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013) (holding an alert from a reliable drug detection dog 
provides probable cause). 
74 Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 2, at *23. 
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within the scope of the initial consent. Moreover, Sanchez’s 
subsequent statement that the tire did not belong to him was not an 
unequivocal withdrawal of consent. Therefore, the Court will likely 
hold the scope of consent was not subsequently limited. Finally, 
since the search of the tire’s exterior was likely constitutional, the 
use of the drug-detection dog on the exterior is also likely 
constitutional. The resulting probable cause from the drug-detection 
dog’s alert along with Sanchez’s additional consent makes it highly 
likely the Court will hold the Trooper’s search of the tire’s interior 
to be constitutional. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit will probably 
uphold the district court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress. 
 
 
 
